Correlated sources passing through broadcast channels is considered in this paper. Each receiver has access to correlated source side information and each source at the sender is kept secret from the unintended receiver. This communication model can be seen as generalizations of Tuncel's source over broadcast channel and Villard et al.'s source over wiretap channel. An outer bound for secure transmission region of arbitrarily correlated sources with the equivocation-rate levels is derived with ultra-low latency and used to prove capacity results for several classes of sources and channels.
Introduction
The communication of two correlated sources S 1 and S 2 over broadcast channel (BC) p(y 1 , y 2 |x) with correlated side information (SI)S 1 andS 2 at the receivers is considered [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] . In addition, each source should be kept as secret as possible from the unintended receiver where the secrecy is measured by the equivocation rate [6] [7] [8] [9] . We refer to this model as the discrete memoryless BC-SI with two confidential sources (DM-BCCS-SI). DM-BCCS-SI model is shown in Fig. 1 and covers various practical applications in distributed video compression, peer-to-peer data distribution systems, and wireless sensor networks. This paper investigates reliability and security of the DM-BCCS-SI [10] [11] [12] [13] . In general, four fundamental issues need to be solved: (i) How to use distributed source codes to decrease transmission load but increase secrecy rates? (ii) How to find capacity of BCs with arbitrarily correlated sources? (iii) How to design coding strategy for secure transmission? (iv) How to build a source-channel coding to derive the optimal bounds or make source-channel separation theorem hold?
Although there have been results about source-channel coding for BCs, we have a limited understanding of *Correspondence: zhuping@wtu.edu.cn 2 College of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wuhan Textile University, 430200, Wuhan, People's Republic of China Full list of author information is available at the end of the article general source-channel matching conditions for reliable transmission, let alone for secure transmission [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . In 2006, Tuncel [20] found the optimal source-channel rate for broadcasting a common source to multiple receivers. In 2013, Villard et al. [21] investigated the source-channel coding for secure transmission of a source over 2-receiver wiretap channel with arbitrarily correlated side information at both receivers. In Tuncel and Villard et al. 's works, the source and channel variables are statistically independent. And in some special cases, it is proved that source-channel separation theorem holds. However, in general, the separation may be suboptimal for broadcasting arbitrarily correlated sources. So far, the well-known sufficient conditions for reliable transmission of arbitrarily correlated sources over BC firstly introduced by Han and Costa in [22] are due to using the joint distribution of source and channel variables. On the other hand, the necessary conditions were provided by Kramer et al. [23] . Recently, we studied broadcast channels with confidential sources (BCCS) and without side information [24] , which generalizes Han-Costa model to secure situation by considering each source kept secret from the unintended recipient. In this paper, we are devoted to establish the sufficient and necessary conditions for secure transmission of the DM-BCCS-SI in Fig. 1 .
Shannon showed that his inner bound is indeed the capacity region of the "restricted" two-way channel, in which the channel inputs of the users depend only on the messages (not on the previous channel outputs). Several improved outer bounds using the "dependence-balance bounds" are proposed by Hekstra and Willems. In this paper, we both consider the inner bound and outer bound. The source (S 1 , S 2 ) is said to be admissible with secrecy level (E S1 , E S2 ) for this BC-SI if for any λ, 0 < λ < 1, and for large enough m and n, there is a code with length-m source sequence and length-n codewords such that
where P (m) e1 and P (m) e2 are the respective error probabilities for receivers 1 and 2,
2 ) is the equivocation rate which denotes the uncertainty for S 1 at receiver 2 given the sequences Y n 2 andS n 2 , the similar description is for
A set of all admissible sources with the equivocation rate levels (S 1 , S 2 , E S1 , E S2 ) satisfying the condition (1) is called secure transmission region.
In this paper, we establish outer and inner bounds of secure transmission region of the DM-BCCS-SI, which consists of a set of admissible sources with a range of secrecy levels. Furthermore, the proposed outer bound is shown to be tight in the following three aspects: (i) Joint source-channel coding, whose distribution relies on joint probability of source and channel variables. (ii) Separate source-channel coding, whose distribution is determined by statistically independent distribution of source and channel variables, is not necessarily the optimal codes for the source or the channel and is refered to as Operational separation in [20, 25] . (iii) Informational separation refers to classical separation in Shannon sense, that is, comparison of the optimal source coding rate region and the channel capacity region is sufficient to find the optimal secure transmission region.
e2 log 2 |S 2 | + 1/m, and define the auxiliary random variables (15) which satisfy (12) . At first, we consider the entropy bounds of a single source S 1 and have the facts (17) where (16) follows from discrete memoryless property and (17) follows from Fano's inequality (13) . And we have
Next, we consider the entropy bounds of two sources S 1 S 2 .
Therefore, we have
We consider another case
And we also have the following steps
According to (18) , we get (4), and similarly get (2), (3), and (5). According to (23) , (27) , (29) , (30), and (31), we get (6), (8) , and (10) and symmetrically get (7), (9) , and (11). 
An inner bound
for all the distributions
Remarks 2 The proof of Theorem 2 uses joint sourcechannel coding. We choose R = 1(m = n) so as to apply joint typical decoding for source and channel sequences, the same method used in [22] [23] [24] 26] . In addition, the receiving sequences Y n 1 andS n 1 can be combined into one such that the proof of Theorem 2 is the same as the proof in [24, Theorem 1] . Consider limitted space, we omit the inner bound proof here. [21] to that of two correlated sources over BC. Inequalities ( 30)- ( 34) and (2) 
Remarks 3 Theorems 1 and 2 extend Villard et al.'s secure transmission of a source over wiretap channel

Special cases
We here consider three classes of DM-BCCS-SI: Joint Source-Channel Coding, A Single Source Passing through BCs with Degraded SI and Independent Sources given SI. Furthermore, we assume R = 1, i.e., n = m. In this case, the capacity theorem proofs in Subsections A and B follow from Theorems 1 and 2 and they are not given here.
Joint source-channel coding
Markov sources and degraded SI
Assume the deterministic side information at the receivers for the DM-BCCS-SI.
and deterministic functions 
More capable BCs with partial degraded SI
Theorem 4 Consider a class of less-noisy DM-BCCS-SI defined by I(U; Y
1 ) ≥ I(U; Y 2 ) for all Markov chains U → X → Y 1 Y 2 ,S 2 −S 1 − S 1 S 2 ,S 1 −S 2 − S 2 (51) (S 1 , S 2 ) with secrecy level (E S1 , E S2 ) is admissible if H(S 2 |S 2 ) < I(U; Y 2 )(52)H S 1 S 2 |S 1 < I(X; Y 1 |U) + I(U; Y 2 ) (53) E S1 < min I(X; Y 1 |U) − I(X; Y 2 |U) + I S 1 ;S 1 |S 2 −I S 1 ;S 2 |S 2 , H S 1 |S 2S2 (54) E S2 = 0 (55) for some distribution p s 1 s 2S1S2 p (u|s 1 s 2 ) p (x|u) p (y 1 y 2 |x).
Operational separation: a single source passing through BCs with degraded SI
A single source S transmission over BC with side informationS 1 andS 2 at both receivers is considered.
Theorem 5 (i) S is reliably transmitted if
(ii) Consider security constraints, S with secrecy level E S is admissible for wiretap channel, Receiver 1 is legitimate user, Receiver 2 can be seen as an eavesdropper, if
for some distribution p S 1S2 |s p (x|u) p (y 1 y 2 |x), and S,S 1 ,S 2 satisfies the Markov chain S →S 1 →S 2 .
For K = 2, rate R is achievable using separate source and channel coders if and only if
where 
Remarks 5 Using operational separation, source variables (S,S
(ii) The secrecy capacity of (E S1 , E S2 )
Remarks 6
The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix A, which is based on stand-alone source and channel codes and applying Slepian-Wolf source coding followed by Marton's BC coding. Information separation for Theorem 6 suggests that source-channel separation in the informational sense is optimal.
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the problem of sending a pair of correlated sources through a broadcast channel with correlated side information at the receivers. In addition, each source should be kept secret from the unintended receiver. Due to the lack of a general source-channel separation theorem for broadcast channels, optimal performance sometimes requires joint source-channel coding such as Theorem 2. We also established a general outer bound and have analyzed three classes of sources and channels in which this general outer bound is tight, that is, source channel coding, operational separation, and informational separation are respectively proved to be optimal performance.
Appendix A
Proof Of Theorem 6
We outline the proof of reliable transmission bound of (S 1 , S 2 ) and the bound of the equivocation-rate pair (E S1 , E S2 ). We start with the proof of the direct part in Case (i). Let (R 1 , R 2 ) satisfy the bounds 
and generate a channel codeword x n u n 1 (l 1 ), u n 2 (l 2 ) . Encoding: Use the above separate source and channel code for encoding. The source encoder finds the bin index m 1 and m 2 of s m 1 and s m 2 respectively using the SlepianWolf source code, and forwards them to the channel encoder. The channel encoder transmits the codeword x n (m 1 , m 2 ) corresponding to the source bin index using Marton's code.
Decoding: We use a separate source and channel decoder. Upon y n 1 , Channel-Decoder 1 tries to find the unique index m 1 such that the corresponding channel codewords satisfy u n 
The first two terms in (68) are close to zero with large m when applying Slepian-Wolf source code, and the last two terms in (68) are also close to zero with large n when applying Marton's code for a semi-deterministic BC. Hence, P (m) e → 0. We next prove the converse for Case (i). Consider (4)-
Consider the Markov chains (58) and (59), we have
Then we get (60)-(62). We next consider Case (ii). Independence of source and channel implies that the DM-BCCS-SI can be viewed as a parallel broadcast channel. That is, in addition to the real BC p(y 1 , y 2 |x), there is a virtual BC with input (S 1 , S 2 ) and two outputsS 1 andS 2 . For the real BC, the inner bound of (E S1 , E S2 ) can follow from [10, Theorem 4], and we here only give the con-verse proof. Let K ,S 1 ,˜2 S, U 1 , U 2 = U 0 ,S 1 = Y 1 ,S 2 = U 2 , and thus inequalities (63)-(64) follow easily from the first term in (10) and the second term in (11) respectively, and the fact (58), that is
Appendix B
Proof of inequalities (25) and (22)
The proof of inequality (25) uses the similar procedure as that in [23, (60) - (65)], and we here give the proof in detail:
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where step (a) follows from Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 [23] For any random variables W , Y n , Z n , we have
Therefore, we get ( 25) .
Consider (75) and (20), we have
and
Therefore, we get (22) . That is
Proof of inequality (24)
The proof of inequality (24) uses the similar procedure as that in [23, (73) - (85)], and we here give the proof in detail. The last two terms in the left-hand side of (23) can be bounded as:
The first term in the left-hand side of (23) can be bounded as
Consider (77) + (78), and we have
Therefore, we get (24) .
Proof of Theorem 3
Inner bound (admissibility):
Consider the case where S1 → K → S2 forms a Markov chain and the deterministic SIS 1 (96) Consider (8), we have
For (46), consider (6) and S 1 →S 1 →S 2 , S 2 →S 2 → S 1 , and the facts
For the first term in (47), consider the first term in (10) , and
So we have 
The second terms in (47) and (48) follow from the facts
Proof of Theorem 4
Inner bound:
Specifically, consider (30) and the facts
Consider (31) and the fact
Consider (32) and the fact
Consider (33) and the facts
Consider (34) and the fact 
Consider (35) and the independent distribution of source and channel variables, we have
Combining (107) and (108), we get (52). 
